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Abstract
This  paper  investigates  the  energy  investment  needs  of  the  European 
Union (EU), including renewable energy.  Europe currently has little or no 
economic growth, and interest-rates are expected to rise.  Given the state 
of  many  EU  countries’  economies,  this  is  a  good  time  to  encourage 
investment because – according to Keynesian economics – extra spending 
can stimulate economic activity.   The current  economic  situation limits 
options for many governments in EU countries, so new approaches may be 
required.  This paper uses ideas from the European Commission, on how a 
‘smart’ electricity grid can enable renewable energy – such as solar power. 
The EU Parliament could enable a market-provided solution  by offering 
incentives to the private sector.  Private investment will be encouraged if 
the  EU  gives  long-term  low-interest-rate  loans  for  renewable  energy 
generation.  Also, a Europe-wide grid makes it profitable to locate solar 
panels  in low-wage countries in  southern Europe,  and sell  electricity  in 
richer countries.
Key words:   renewable energy; solar power; wind power; 
smart grid; European Union; European commission; economic 
recovery
EES classifications: 3.5  3.7  3.9  3.10 3.18
JEL classification:  E62; H120; Q42
1. Introduction
The current economic environment in European Union remains fragile. The 
Euro-zone economy is about to enter its third recession since 2009, with 
its  strategy  based  on  fiscal  consolidation  failing  to  deliver.   Draconian 
fiscal cuts implemented in the Euro-zone countries have led to a collapse 
of domestic demand leading gradually, but steadily, to an erosion in Euro-
zone demand, hitting hard (in particular in the last two years) the French 
and  Italian  economies.   The  gradual  realisation  of  the  impasse  these 
policies  led  to,  gives  rise  to  the  search  of  new  policies  that  could 
potentially be utilised as a means of providing a long-term solution.  The 
policies  employed  in  the  USA  seem  to  offer  an  obvious  alternative. 
Notwithstanding the differences featuring the USA and the Euro-zone or 
the European Union economies,  the policies  pursued so far in the USA 
have  had  a  much  more  positive  impact  on  the  recovery  of  the  USA 
economy since 2009.  They present therefore a paradigm that needs to be 
considered by the EU authorities. 
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One of the unintended consequences of the EU economic policies since 
2009 is the risk reduction when investing in EU countries’ bond market. 
While this has been relatively successful, it has led to an increased risk of 
private  sector  losses,  in  particular  when  investing  EU  countries’  bond 
market.   As  a  result,  the current  economic  environment  limits  private-
sector investment.  This includes investment in renewable energy, a sector 
vital for the sustainability of all EU economies.  
Indeed, European consumption fell since 2008; Europe currently has little 
private investment (Koo,  2013:  143).   Observ’ER (2012:  115-21)  report 
Italian solar power at a standstill;  German solar power subsidies cut; no 
immediate increase in solar capacity expected in France; UK solar panels 
subsidies halved in 2011; and Spanish government support for renewable 
energy  removed  in  2012.   “The  situation  in  Europe  is  fraught.   Many 
medium-sized  companies  are  going  into  voluntary  liquidation,  closing 
subsidiaries  or  plants  to  cut  their  losses”  (Observ’ER,  2012:  121). 
Renewable energy in the EU is stalled (Observ’ER, 2012: 115-21; European 
Commission, 2010: 3; Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012: 52); “The ongoing debt 
crisis in Europe is likely to make it difficult to sustain the region’s clean 
energy investments in coming years” (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012: 52). 
“Europe’s leading role in the PV market is coming to an end […] Going 
forward, the driving forces will be in countries like China, the USA, Japan 
and India” (EPIA, 2013a: 6). 
The fiscal squeeze of Portugal, Ireland and Greece in 2011-12 has caused 
contagion  to  Spain  and  Italy  in  2012  and  2013,  as  reflected  by  the 
increased interest rate premium financial markets require when investing 
in these countries bond market.  It has also led to increased interest rate 
in debt servicing, to a lesser extent in France and Belgium, reflecting the 
EU dimension of the problem.  As a result, specific Euro-zone countries’ 
fiscal  and financial  difficulties encountered,  in particular when trying to 
recycle national debt, has led to an EU-wide problem with consequences 
not anticipated when the first bail-out was provided in Greece in spring 
2010.     
However, the PIIGS are endowed with solar resources to a greater extent 
than the northern Euro-zone countries.   As a result of  these resources, 
coupled  with  appropriate  policies  at  an  EU level,  can provide  the  way 
forward  for  these  countries  by  restoring  their  fiscal  sustainability  and 
financial  credibility.   However,  the ‘appropriate’  policies  at  an EU level 
based on raising  funds  for  investment  in  solar  power  are  subject  to  a 
revision of the current economic orthodoxy,  championed by the fiscally 
prudent countries in the Euro-zone namely Germany, Austria, Finland and 
the  Netherlands,  accompanied  by  Denmark  and  Sweden  at  a  EU  wide 
framework.  In the absence of these policies, investing in solar power is 
rendered  impossible,  subjecting  PIIGS  to  a  chronic  process  of  fiscal 
consolidation with no impeding end, and above all, with no guarantee that 
the policies will deliver. 
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A process is  already set in motion by the economic developments and 
policies implemented in France that, although not diametrically opposing 
the policy prescriptions ‘suggested’ by Germany, certainly challenge them 
and put them to the test of delaying deficit reduction by two years, against 
the  will  of  the  European  Commission.   These  developments  could 
potentially stall current policies in EU countries, which generally impose 
austerity.   The  slowdown  in  German  economic  growth  would  be  the 
decisive factor, in terms of determining the speed for such a revision.        
The  solution  put  forward  in  this  paper  therefore  focuses  on  bringing 
together Keynesian economic policies at an EU and Euro-zone level, based 
on fiscal expansion in particular increases in government expenditure and 
renewable energy, in particular solar.  Although it is recognised that there 
are  many  other  areas  requiring  urgent  financial  assistance  such  as 
education and health care, investing in the energy sector provides several 
long-term  benefits.   First,  it  is  conducive  to  limiting  global  warming; 
second, it reduces dependence on imported energy; and third, it fills in the 
gap resulting from the decommissioning of nuclear energy.  Investing in 
electricity seems unlikely to crowd out (discourage) investment in other 
sectors.   Lastly,  it  can  boost  long-term  investment  and  employment 
creation in EU countries and regions that experience unprecedented high 
unemployment rates.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.  In section 2, a Keynesian 
view  of  recessions  is  provided,  with  emphasis  placed  on  the  2007-09 
financial and economic crisis and its implications for economic policies.  In 
section 3, the differences in the nature of government and private sector 
incentives are identified.  Proposals for bringing together the two types of 
incentives  in  the  energy  sector  are  also  presented  and  discussed.   In 
section 4, the energy from renewable sources is considered, by primarily 
focusing  on  the  case  of  solar  power.  Finally,  in  section  5,  the  main 
conclusions are presented.
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2. A Keynesian analysis of recessions
Global  financial  crisis  dominated  Europe  since  Lehman  Brothers  bank 
collapsed (Schäfer, 2012: 181); Worth (2010) called it the ‘second Great 
Depression’.  An economy in a mild recession may repair itself, but Keynes 
(1936:  324)  suggested  it  could  take  25  years  to  achieve  optimal 
employment and investment.  Japan shows that an economic slump can 
last  for  decades.   The  European  economy  or  at  least  the  Euro-zone 
economies seem to be following Japan’s demise from its economic apogee 
in the mid-late 1980s.  Six years from the onset of the Euro-zone debt 
crisis in 2009, the grim economic outlook of the area, including Germany, 
makes the prospect of a ‘lost decade’ a realistic outcome with immense 
consequences for employment, let alone the evolution of EU institutions.   
Kitromilides (2011: 526) claimed “If the markets form the view that the 
“age of austerity” strategy is counterproductive, this may strain further 
rather than calm down market nerves, and change perceptions of what 
constitutes  a  “credible”  government  policy  to  deal  with  ballooning 
deficits.”  Koo (2013: 145) claimed in the current recession, “government 
borrowing and spending becomes absolutely indispensable in saving the 
economy”.  IMF (2012) estimated that “in coming years, additional global 
financing of potentially $1 trillion could be needed [..] countries like Italy 
and  Spain,  that  are  fundamentally  able  to  repay  their  debts,  could 
potentially be forced into a solvency crisis by abnormal funding costs”. 
Delong  et  al.  (2012:  235)  wrote  “Financial  crises  and  demand-induced 
recessions  appear  to  have  an  impact  on  potential  output  even  after 
normal  conditions  are restored.   This  makes it  plausible  that measures 
that mitigate their effects would have long-run benefits.”  
If consumer spending and investment are too low, Keynesians recommend 
more  government  spending,  to  create  jobs;  this  could  include  public 
works, like the US government’s ‘New Deal’ in the 1930s.  Recession could 
be  improved  if  governments  “boost  the  public-spending  component  of 
environmental  policies”  (Kennet,  Drosos  &  Tsotsolas,  2013:  318). 
Government debt-financed expenditure may be appropriate in a recession 
(Todorova, 2013: 70); fiscal policy is more effective than monetary policy 
in a recession (Koo, 2013; Blanchard & Leigh, 2013).  Kitromilides (2011: 
523) and Blanchard & Leigh (2013) suggested government spending helps 
an economy recover from recession.  Delong et al. (2012: 235) wrote “at 
moments like the present – when interest rates are constrained by the 
zero bound, the output gap is large, and cyclical unemployment is high – 
fiscal policy is likely to be more potent than standard estimates suggest. 
This  conclusion  boosts  the  benefits  of  expansionary  fiscal  policy  in  a 
depressed economy substantially.”
In response to the 2008 global crisis, “At year-end 2008, about $6.8 trillion 
in new federal government loans, liability guarantees or asset guarantees 
to financial  services firms was outstanding that had not existed a year 
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earlier”  (FDIC,  2009:  17);  renewable  energy  was  part  of  the  stimulus 
package  (European  Commission,  2010:  8).   Since  2008,  “the  Obama 
administration allocated more than ninety billion dollars (of nearly eight 
hundred billion  dollars  total)  in grants  and tax incentives for  a host  of 
clean  energy  programs”  (Simmons,  Coyle  &  Chapman,  2014:  38).   EU 
governments spent much less: $3.2 Billion in 2010 and $2.6 Billion in 2011 
(Pew  Charitable  Trusts,  2012:  31).   Since  2008,  President  Obama’s 
Keynesian policies (e.g. supporting the U.S. car industry) seem successful, 
because USA experienced about 2% growth per year from 2009 (OECD, 
2014b).   Other  countries  such  as  Germany  enacted  similar  stimulus 
packages,  and  “many  countries’  economies  started  to  recover  quickly 
after the enactment of stimulus packages” (Dullien, 2012: 8).  However, 
some European  countries  (such  as  Greece,  Italy,  Ireland,  Portugal  and 
Spain) had to  reduce government spending (Dullien, 2012: 10): austerity 
was  forced  on  Eurozone  countries  after  2008,  because  of  balance-of-
payments deficits; rising national debts (due to nationalisation of troubled 
financial  institutions);  and fear  of  financial  markets  (Kitromilides,  2011: 
520).  If a Eurozone country defaults on its debts, it could initiate a chain 
of events leading to the end of the Euro (Strobel, 2005) – causing chaos. 
Many  economists  have  argued  that  reform  of  financial  institutions  in 
Europe is needed (Syrrakos, 2010).  Issing (2000) argued that the Euro 
requires political union.  The European Financial Stability Facility and the 
European  Stability  Mechanism may help,  but  are  not  sufficient  for  the 
current  crisis:  the existence of  the Euro currency and even the EU are 
threatened  (Syrrakos,  2010).   Capital  flight  occurred  from  peripheral 
Eurozone  countries  to  Germany,  lowering  German  interest-rates  (Koo, 
2013: 147).  Some European governments were downgraded by ratings 
agencies such as Standard & Poor (Bastasin, 2012: 94-5), raising their cost 
of borrowing.  Many observers, such as Griffith-Jones & Jolly (2013: 46), 
argue Europe  must  change course  and follow  President  Obama’s  lead: 
“François Hollande, the new President, has suggested a new program for 
European  growth,  which  in  principle  has  been  accepted  by  European 
leaders at the summit in late June 2012.  The program adopted by the 
leaders  would  represent  an  increase  in  investment  of  as  much  as  1 
percent  of  GDP  in  the  European  Union  (EU).   It  is  key  that  it  be 
implemented quickly  and on a  sufficient  scale  so as  to  have sufficient 
impact soon on growth and employment.”
The European Commission (2010) argues for intervention by the European 
Parliament,  to  facilitate  recovery  from  economic  crisis,  and  tackle 
problems facing the energy sector.  “The urgent task for the EU is to agree 
the tools which will make the necessary shift possible and thus ensure that 
Europe can emerge from recession on a more competitive,  secure and 
sustainable path” (European Commission, 2010: 3).  Griffith-Jones & Jolly 
(2013: 50) wrote “Coordinated by the international organizations in the 
2008 crisis, governments acted as a banker of last resort – but not as an 
employer  of  last  resort  for  protecting  workers  and  stimulating 
employment.  In this respect, the treatment of labor was totally different 
from the treatment of  finance and capital.   The banks gained, but the 
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people suffered.  More serious, the lack of broader action means that the 
crisis still continues”.
3.   Government versus private investment?
In order for European governments to become the ‘employer of last resort’ 
in terms of enhancing the regions’ growth potential and promote policies 
conducive to job creation, a change in the way they view fiscal injection 
for investment projects should take place.  While ‘old-fashioned’ above-
inflation wage increases in public sector employees should be ruled out as 
an  option,  raising  funds  for  investment  programmes  may  be  the  only 
viable solution to the current impasse.   The energy sector provides an 
excellent framework for such investment projects.     
Indeed, since 2010 the European Commission (2010) has a plan to address 
energy problems and help Europe survive economic crises, estimating the 
cost  by  2020  as  €1  Trillion.   This  amount  seems  arbitrary;  but  the 
European Commission is the only agency which can write EU legislation. 
Data comparing USA with EU expenditure is indicative of this.  The U.S. 
federal government deficit was 10% of GDP in 2009, 9% in 2010, and 8.7% 
in 2011 – a total injection of about 28% of GDP (Obama, 2012: Table 15.6): 
that  is,  the  USA invested  28% more than  Europe  did.   The U.S.  fiscal 
injection far exceeds the European Commission (2010) recommendation of 
€1 Trillion, which is 8.3% of EU GDP in 2013 (Eurostat, 2012b).
Pew Charitable Trusts (2012: 39-43) reported public and private spending 
on solar power in 2011 as $4.4 Billion in France, $19.9 Billion in Germany, 
and $28 Billion in Italy.  Solar power generating capacity in these countries 
in  2011 increased by  2.7,  7.4,  and 10.2  Giga-Watts  (GW) respectively; 
‘Feed-in’  tariff  systems varied  between EU countries  (Observ'ER,  2012: 
115-21).  These figures imply the cost of solar power (in $ Billion per GW) 
was  1.63  in  France,  2.69  in  Germany  and  2.75  in  Italy  –  a  weighted 
average of  approximately  €1.85  Billion  (using exchange-rate  €0.79  per 
US$:  OECD, 2012).   Hence, €1 Trillion should pay for  540 GW of  solar 
power peak generating capacity (output is lower when skies are cloudy, 
and at night: Grossmann et al., 2012: 168).  Solar electricity generating 
capacity  in  EU  was  51  GW  in  2011  (Observ’ER,  2012:  114),  so  an 
additional  540  GW  would  increase  solar  power  to  about  15%  of  EU 
electricity needs.  This would create jobs (one firm had 3,690 employees 
per GW of solar electricity production capacity: Grossmann et al., 2012: 
177).
Renewable energy has ‘public good’ aspects: benefits are non-excludable 
(every  EU  citizen  would  gain  from  cleaner  air,  reduced  risk  of  global 
warming, and less dependence on imported fuel).  The EU could pay for 
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solar panels directly; but many economists advocate production by private 
firms.  
Cherrier  (2013)  investigated  economics-as-engineering,  including 
“engagement with policy making”, to nudge private firms towards socially 
desirable outcomes.  Minsky (1992: 5) wrote “increasing complexity of the 
financial  structure,  in  connection  with  a  greater  involvement  of 
governments  as  refinancing  agents  for  financial  institutions  as  well  as 
ordinary business firms (both of which are marked characteristics of the 
modern world), may make the system behave differently than in earlier 
eras.   In  particular,  the  much  greater  participation  of  national 
governments in assuring that finance does not degenerate as in the 1929-
1933 period means that the down side vulnerability of aggregate profit 
flows  has  been  much  diminished”.   Griffith-Jones  &  Jolly  (2013:  46-7) 
suggested a balanced-budget multiplier could help Europe: increase tax 
and government spending by similar amounts, in richer countries such as 
Germany.  
Electricity  from  solar  energy  is  no  more  expensive  than  generating 
electricity from fossil fuels in parts of Italy and Spain (Grossmann et al., 
2012: 167), so investing in solar power could be profitable.  The price of 
electricity generated by solar panels fell in recent decades, but is still not 
quite competitive with other forms of electricity generation such as gas 
(Borenstein, 2012: 86; Grossmann et al., 2012: 167).  Observ'ER (2012: 
131)  predicted  solar  power  will  reach  ‘grid  parity’  by  2016  for  the 
residential sector; but for investment to occur before 2016, subsidies may 
be needed, like the feed-in tariffs for rooftops solar panels on houses (Pew 
Charitable Trusts, 2012: 6).  The cost of maintaining solar power facilities 
is below US$10 per Mega-Watt hour (Grossmann et al., 2012: 168).  
Renewable energy systems often have very large initial investments (such 
as installing solar panels or a wind farm, and connecting cables to the 
electricity distribution network), followed by decades of profits from selling 
electricity  –  there  is  a  long  payback  period.   Market  interest-rates  are 
currently  low,  but  it  would  be  risky  to  borrow  for  such  long-term 
investments using commercial loans.  EU policy is “a failure due to the 
lack of long-term price signals to induce large investments in low-carbon 
technologies”  (Edenhofer  et  al.,  2013:  S14).   “Without  European 
cooperation,  public  funds  will  not  be  able  to  channel  investment  into 
technologies  of  the  future  which  are  still  too  risky  for  investors.  [..]  A 
genuine common European energy policy is the only solution” (EU, 2012: 
14).   Since  the  2008  global  crisis,  Bastasin  (2012:  62)  wrote  of  “The 
timidity of the European Commission in the wake of real emergencies”. 
“Renewed  political  resolve  is  needed  to  restore  investor 
confidence,  remove  bottlenecks  and  maintain  a  reliable  but 
dynamic framework for the remuneration of PV” (EPIA, 2013a: 57; 
emphasis in original). 
The European Investment Bank (2013) announced a €0.65 Billion ‘Climate 
Awareness  Bond’;  the  European  Central  Bank  could  arrange  for  much 
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larger loans.  Griffith-Jones & Jolly (2013) and European Commission & EIB 
(2013)  suggest  compromise  between  state  and  private  investment  is 
desirable.  European Commission & EIB (2013: 11-2) discussed three ways 
to lend to SME (Small and Medium Enterprises), based on €10.4 Billion of 
public funds from ‘Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises’ (COSME) & Horizon 2020, and European Structural and 
Investment  Funds  (ESIF)  with  EIB  &  ‘European  Investment  Fund’  (EIF) 
resources:
• Option 1 is for new loans, blending 75% of guarantees with 25% of 
securitisation.  Portfolios would be built up by banks in 2 to 3 years, 
generating about €55 Billion of lending: a leverage ratio of 5.
• Option  2  allows  securitisation  of  new  and  existing SME  loan 
portfolios.  This would increase the impact, allowing lending about 
€65 Billion: a leverage of roughly 6.
• Option 3 is like option 2, but adds existing SME loans and working 
capital.  Pooling risks allows for a better portfolio diversification, so 
this option generates lending of €100 Billion: a leverage of about 10.
Griffith-Jones & Jolly  have put similar suggestions forward (2013:  46-7), 
suggesting Keynesian intervention using one or more of three ‘paths’:
• First ‘path’: raise the EU budget by €5 Billion, which the EIB could 
use as a risk buffer, lending an extra €10 Billion via ‘project bonds’. 
EIB money (using a mezzanine or intermediate tranche) forms 25% 
of  total  investment,  with  25% by  private  investors,  and  50% by 
insurance  companies  and  pension  funds.   €40  Billion  of  new 
investment flows from a €5 Billion injection: a leverage ratio of 8.
• Second  ‘path’:  increase  EIB  capital  by  some  EU  member  states 
injecting loans.   Participating EU country governments  pay 5% of 
desired total spending.  For an initial €11.6 Billion public investment, 
the EIB lends €95 Billion initially, and €105 Billion in the following 
three years.  The EIB often co-finances with the private sector, so 
this €200 Billion could increase by a further €190 Billion.
• Third  ‘path’:  add  existing  European  Structural  Funds  which  have 
been agreed, but not yet been used.  This could add €25 Billion per 
year from 2014.
Combining these three ‘paths’, according to Griffiths-Jones & Jolly, would 
have injected 0.5% of EU GDP from 2013 to 2015.  One of these options, 
or one of the ‘paths’ suggested by Griffiths-Jones & Jolly (2013), could fund 
renewable energy – but cost taxpayers less than the €1 Trillion needed to 
modernise  EU  energy,  according  to  European  Commission  (2010). 
Griffiths-Jones & Jolly (2013: 48-9) claim rating agencies will maintain EIB’s 
AAA status if leverage does not exceed 8.  To increase financial injections 
to €1 Trillion, (richer) EU governments need to invest more than Griffith-
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Jones  &  Jolly  (2013)  and  European  Commission  &  EIB  (2013)  suggest. 
Political  decision-making  is  complicated,  probably  requiring  agreement 
between the  EU  parliament  and  national  governments  of  EU  countries 
such as Germany and France.  However, the recent turbulence in financial 
markets and the resurgence of Europe’s debt problems may prompt the 
EU member countries’  leaders to review their  approach and attitude to 
renewable energy investment programmes.  
Renewable power is intermittent, associated with ‘common-mode failure’ 
(Boisvert,  2012).   The  solution  may  be  an  EU-wide  electricity  grid. 
“Utilities  don’t  like  to  make  way  for  intermittent  renewable  surges  by 
turning  off  coal,  nuclear,  and  combined-cycle  gas  plants;  firing  up  the 
boilers after a shut-down takes time and wastes fuel and money, and they 
will need those generators back on line, quickly, when wind and solar cut 
out” (Boisvert, 2012).  Private firms are unlikely to build a Europe-wide 
electricity  grid;  but  the  EU could,  combined  with  cheap loans  to  firms 
producing renewable energy.
The  European  Parliament  could  impose  a  centrally-planned  system  of 
electricity generation.  It is difficult for a central planner to dictate power 
generation  at  each  location:  a  small  miscalculation  might  be  costly  to 
European taxpayers, distorting electricity generation.   Many economists 
advocate  free-market  solutions  to  such problems:  competition  between 
firms provides good outcomes for consumers, as each firm has a strong 
incentive to find out if (for example) ‘Concentrated Solar Power’ is more 
cost-effective than photovoltaic power in a particular location.  But due to 
market  failures,  any  “decentralized  market  solution  generated  by 
decentralized agents like firms, consumers and investors that do not take 
into account relevant multiple externalities of their actions, e.g. climate 
damages,  technological  spill-overs,  and  security  standards,  cannot  be 
expected  to  yield  the  welfare-optimal  quantity”  of  renewable  energy 
(Edenhofer et al., 2013: S13).  If neither central planning nor free markets 
produces a good outcome, what might work?
“Scientific  and economic  experts  are  in  increasing  agreement  that  our 
current energy paradigm is no longer tenable, not least due to reserve and 
supply uncertainties, price volatility, and fiscal and environmental strains 
on  the  world’s  major  markets  and  ecosystems”  (Simmons,  Coyle  & 
Chapman, 2014: 29).  We next turn to energy from renewable sources. 
4.  Energy from renewable sources
Gnansounou  (2011:  399)  and  European  Commission  (2010)  expressed 
concern about dependence on imported energy.  Europe imports most of 
its energy (European Union, 2012: 5); EU is the world’s largest importer of 
energy,  and "Our  standard of  living requires  huge amounts  of  energy" 
Page 11
Renewable energy in Europe
(European Union, 2012: 3).  Decommissioning older European electricity 
plants has reduced output from nuclear power,  coal,  and fuel oil  (EPIA, 
2013a: 42).  Fossil fuels such as oil or gas may become less reliable and 
more expensive as accessible sources become exhausted.  Potential for 
nuclear power seems limited: uranium stocks for nuclear  fission may run 
out in the next few decades (European Commission, 2007: 26); nuclear 
fusion seems  decades  from  commercial  production.   European 
Commission (2010: 3) warned that some parts of the EU could lose more 
than  a  third  of  their  existing  generation  capacity  by  2020,  as  nuclear 
power  plants  are  decommissioned.   Shale  gas  (via  “fracking”)  might 
reduce water availability for farming; contaminate water supplies, soil, & 
air;  exacerbate  global  warming;  and  cause  earthquakes  –  “the  lack  of 
public acceptance represents a barrier to further shale gas development” 
(European Commission, 2014: 5-7).
PhotoVoltaic solar panels now provide about 2.6% of Europe’s electricity 
(EPIA,  2013a:  6).   Renewable  energy  has  advantages,  including  less 
dependence on imported fuels; lower pollution, such as greenhouse gas 
emission; and in the long term, lower electricity prices (fossil fuel prices 
are expected to rise as reserves decline,  whereas renewable energy is 
becoming cheaper) (Observ’ER, 2011).  European Commission (2007: 3) 
wrote “Energy accounts for 80% of all greenhouse gas (GHG) emission in 
the EU; it is at the root of climate change and most air pollution.  The EU is 
committed to addressing this – by reducing EU and worldwide greenhouse 
gas  emissions  at  a  global  level  to  a  level  that  would  limit  the  global 
temperature increase to 2°C compared to pre-industrial levels.  However, 
current energy and transport policies would mean EU CO2 emissions would 
increase by around 5% by 2030 and global emissions would rise by 55%. 
The present energy policies within the EU are not sustainable.”  
Wind  and  solar  power  “have  lower  nameplate  prices  than  nuclear” 
electricity  (Boisvert,  2012).   Renewable  energy  could  support  many 
objectives  –  including  energy security,  reduced environmental  damage, 
green jobs, green growth, and poverty reduction (Edenhofer et al., 2013: 
S13).   Solar  power  research  is  carried  out  in  Europe,  including  Spain 
(Fernández-Reche  et  al.,  2006),  Finland  (Hashmi  et  al.,  2011),  and 
Germany  (Prucnal  et  al.,  2012).   EU  support  for  solar  power  could 
encourage technological advances, keeping Europe at the forefront of non-
polluting  energy-generating  technology  (creating  long-term  jobs,  and 
exporting  renewable  energy  equipment  to  the  rest  of  the  world). 
Grossmann  et  al.  (2012:  186)  predicted  global  employment  in  making 
solar panels will increase to 2 million people by 2030.
EU  support  for  renewable  energy  could  provide  internal  and  external 
economies of  scale,  and promote more research – improving efficiency 
from  new  technologies  such  as  ‘Passivated  Emitter  and  Rear  Cell’  or 
‘Passivated Emitter and Rear Locally-Diffused’ panels  (Observ'ER,  2012: 
125).  “Europeans consider that the European Union is best placed to take 
effective action against the effects of the financial and economic crisis”; in 
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2012,  58% of  respondents  support  “increasing  the  share  of  renewable 
energy in the EU by 20% by 2020” (European Commission, 2012: 20; 22). 
73%  of  Europeans  interviewed  consider  it  important  “to  support  an 
economy that  uses fewer natural  resources and emits  less greenhouse 
gas” (European Commission,  2012: 21).   Food production may  increase 
due to partial shade from solar panels, because some crops are damaged 
by ‘photoinhibition’, i.e. too much sunlight (Murchie, Pinto & Horton, 2009: 
541).
In 2007, the European Commission advocated every EU country “should 
have the flexibility to promote the renewable energies most suited to their 
specific potential and priorities” (European Commission, 2007: 14).  But 
European Commission (2010: 20) had a new viewpoint:  “Secure energy 
supplies, an efficient use of  resources, affordable prices and innovative 
solutions are crucial to our long-term sustainable growth, job creation and 
quality of life.  Member States have agreed that these challenges will be 
tackled  most  effectively  by  policies  and  action  at  EU  level,  by 
‘Europeanising’ energy policy.  This includes directing EU funding support 
towards public priorities that markets fail to meet and that bring the most 
European value”.
4.1   Calculation
To provide a geographical perspective on this plan to help Europe, we now 
report statistical evidence in the form of graphs and maps.  This paper 
uses ten countries as case studies.  The ‘PIIGS’ (Portugal,  Ireland, Italy, 
Greece, Spain) are often used as examples of troubled EU countries; the 
other  five  (Netherlands,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Finland) 
experienced much better economic growth since 2008.  Figure 1 shows 
national  income  per  person  at  constant  prices  (OECD,  2014a:  series 
LNBQR): Gross Domestic Product (GDP) using the expenditure approach, in 
national currency.  The authors divide GDP by population (series POPNC); 
and  then  convert  this  to  an  index,  equal  to  100  in  2008  quarter  1. 
Equivalent Greek data are unavailable, so Greece data in Figure 1 are from 
OECD (2014a: series VOBARSA: in national currency).  The authors smooth 
the data, using a ‘Moving Average’ process.
Map  1  was  produced  by  the  authors,  using  software  on  the  Eurostat 
(2014b) website; Map 1 uses youth unemployment as a proxy for poverty 
in  general.   Countries  are  indicated  using  NUTS1  boundaries;  NUTS2 
regions are also shown.
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4.2   Results
Evidence in this section allows us to assess links between geographical, 
economic,  and political  factors  in  Europe;  in  particular,  the question  of 
whether  policy  decisions  should  be  taken  at  national  level,  or  by  the 
European Union.
Figure 1:  GDP since 2008, in ten case study countries
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Figure 1 depicts Germany and (to a lesser extent) Finland recovering since 
2008; other countries show little or no recovery.  All European countries 
could benefit from more investment, to reduce unemployment and raise 
living standards; but Figure 1 makes it clear that some countries are more 
in need than others.  To put Figure 1 in context, Map 1 represents youth 
unemployment – as a measure of poverty in Europe.
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Map 1:  unemployment rate among young adults (age 15 to 24) in 
2012
Source: authors’ analysis using Eurostat 
(2014b).
Of the ten case study countries investigated in 
this  paper,  the  most  serious  economic 
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problems appear to be in southern Europe – as shown in Figure 1.  Map 1 
confirms this picture: areas with the highest youth unemployment tend to 
be  in  southern  Europe.   Perhaps  by  coincidence,  problem  areas  in 
southern Europe seem to match areas of greatest solar power potential: as 
noted in section 2 above, southern Europe is the most appropriate location 
for solar power (for an EU-wide system).  Map 2 indicates which parts of 
Europe  have  most  sunlight,  using  ‘Global  Horizontal  Irradiation’  from 
SolarGIS (2014); southern Europe is appropriate for solar power: Portugal, 
Italy, Greece and Spain are particularly effective locations. 
Borenstein (2012: 72) claimed “The three broad categories of renewable 
energy that are considered closest to being scalable and cost competitive 
are wind, solar, and biomass”.  Of these, “Solar power is produced only 
during daylight hours and tends to peak in the middle of the day.  In many 
areas, this is close to coincident with the highest electricity demand, which 
usually  occurs on summer afternoons” (Borenstein,  2012:  74);  whereas 
wind power often produces most power at times of  lower demand and 
prices.  This suggests most EU funding should go into solar power; the 
most appropriate location for solar power is southern Europe, e.g. Spain, 
Portugal, Italy and Greece (Strobel et al., 2009; Nielsen et al., 2010), which 
(according to Figure 1 and Map 1) are currently in urgent need of support. 
Wind power could be also supported, especially in northern Europe.  
Map 2: solar irradiation in Europe
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Source: SolarGIS (2014).
Southern Europe seems ideal to produce solar power – but local electricity 
prices may be low; areas of high electricity demand are often in northern 
Europe.  This suggests a north-south dimension is needed, in a European 
electricity grid.  Also, wind and solar power output is influenced by the 
weather (Edenhofer et al. 2013: S17).  A grid could smooth solar power 
supply variation due to local clouds (EPIA, 2012: 25-8), and also smooth 
demand variations over time by combining consumption in East & West 
Europe.  “It’s a bit like having a bunch of hamsters generating your power, 
each  in  a  separate  cage  with  a  treadmill.   At  any  given  time,  some 
hamsters  will  be sleeping or  eating and some will  be running  on their 
treadmill.  If you have only one hamster, the treadmill is either turning or 
it isn’t, so the power’s either on or off.  With two hamsters, the odds are 
better that one will be on a treadmill at any given point in time and your 
chances  of  running,  say,  your  blender,  go  up.   Get  enough  hamsters 
together and the odds are pretty good that at least a few will always be on 
the  treadmill,  cranking  out  the  kilowatts”  (American  Meteorological 
Society: 2007).  Hence, the European Parliament may need to pay for a 
‘smart grid’ to distribute electricity.  Brancucci Martínez-Anido et al. (2013: 
207-8) wrote “the European transmission network is experiencing serious 
underinvestment”.   European  Commission  (2013b)  claimed  over  40% 
more capacity in Europe’s electricity transmission will be needed by 2020. 
The electricity  distribution  grid must be ‘smart’  “to avoid  the need for 
costly interventions in the future” (EPIA, 2012: 9).  Because energy from 
sunshine and wind vary with the weather,  more reliance on renewable 
energy  “highlights  the  need  to  accelerate  the  modernisation  of  the 
electricity  grid”  including  grid  balancing  and  improved  flexibility; 
electricity  should  be  generated  “where  it  makes  most  economic  and 
environmental sense.  Factors such as distance to consumption centres, 
implied  grid  needs  and  issues  related  to  public  acceptance  and  job 
creation  clearly  also  play  a  role  and  cannot  be  ignored”  (European 
Commission,  2011:  5).   EPIA  (2013b)  claimed  “The  Renewable  Energy 
Directive requires Member States to upgrade their electricity infrastructure 
in time to allow for the large-scale integration of renewable power.  The 
European  Commission  should  systematically  control  the  effective 
implementation of this requirement.  As decentralised generation will have 
to become a key component of the energy system, a stronger focus on the 
distribution  grid  system will  be  required  to  allow  for  the  cost-effective 
integration  of  renewable  energy  sources  such  as  solar  PV”.   Eurostat 
(2014a) data confirm that in 2013, electricity prices differed dramatically 
between countries; suggesting an EU-wide grid could benefit consumers in 
high-price countries, and producers in low-price countries (for example, it 
would help Germany cope without nuclear power).
Investing  in  solar  power  could  be  effective  in  helping  Europe  out  of 
recession.   But  can  southern  European  governments  afford to  support 
such investments?  To assess this, Figure 2 uses ‘financial net worth’ of 
each country’s government as a proportion of that country’s GDP.  Large 
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government debts make it difficult for state agencies in PIIGS countries to 
borrow – even if the Troika had not imposed spending rules on them.  At 
the time of writing, some European governments seem powerless: due to 
previous borrowing (bailing out commercial banks), governments cannot 
borrow at interest-rates low enough to support private investment.  
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Figure 2:  Debt levels since 2008, in ten case study countries
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Figure 2 indicates a problem: the five PIIGS countries, which are most in 
need of fiscal injection, are least able to afford it.  Figure 2 shows high 
levels of government debts in these five countries.  But debts in many 
European countries are not at alarming levels, compared with historical 
standards: for example, UK national debt in 2013 (quarter 3) was 89% of 
GDP (OECD, 2014b), compared with 200% after World War Two (although 
average debt maturity complicates this issue).  Hence, it may be plausible 
for  countries  such  as  Germany  to  borrow  money,  in  order  to  support 
investment in southern Europe.  However, such deals are difficult to co-
ordinate;  international  electricity  distribution  requires  a  coordinated 
approach – which might be arranged by the European Union.
If  countries  most  affected  by  crisis  (e.g.  Greece)  are  prioritised  for 
investments  by  the  European  Union,  modelling  using  the  HEIMDAL 
algorithm suggests this would raise EU GDP by about 0.6% and create 1.2 
million  jobs  in  two  years;  indirect  effects  such  as  improved  business 
confidence would help further (Griffiths-Jones & Jolly, 2013: 48-9).
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